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Bayesian inference offers an optimal means of processing environmental information and so an 
advantage in natural selection. We consider the apparent, recent trend in increasing dysfunctional 
disagreement in e.g. political debate. This is puzzling because Bayesian inference benefits from 
powerful convergence theorems, precluding dysfunctional disagreement. Information overload is a 
plausible factor limiting the applicability of full Bayesian inference, but what is the link with 
dysfunctional disagreement? Individuals striving to be Bayesian-rational, but challenged by 
information overload, might simplify by using Bayesian Networks or the separation of questions into 
knowledge partitions, the latter formalized with quantum probability theory. We demonstrate the 
massive simplification afforded by either approach, but also show how they contribute to 
dysfunctional disagreement.  
 
Keywords: Bayesian inference, disagreement, entrenchment, rationality, decision making  
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1. Background  1 
 2 
“Truthiness is tearing apart our country ... It used to be, everyone was entitled to their own 3 
opinion, but not their own facts. But that's not the case anymore.”  4 
–Stephen Colbert, January 2006 5 
 6 
Living organisms depend on the optimal processing of environmental information, for example, 7 
regarding foraging, mate selection, or the assessment of predation risks. Environmental information 8 
is typically uncertain, and so has to be processed probabilistically. The established standard for 9 
probabilistic inference is Bayesian Probability Theory ([1]; we will refer to it as just Bayesian theory 10 
or occasionally full Bayesian theory, for emphasis). Bayesian theory provides a set of mutually 11 
coherent principles for probabilistic reasoning on uncertain premises. Bayesian theory benefits from 12 
powerful normative arguments, such as the Dutch Book Theorem, which shows that Bayesian 13 
probabilities will never lead to inconsistencies, such as certain loss in a combination of gambles [1]. 14 
Accordingly, Bayesian reasoning is often characterized as rational. There is an immense body of work 15 
successfully validating Bayesian models of human cognition [2-4]; these models are not universally 16 
successful, but they are successful enough to allow confidence that humans can be sometimes 17 
rational in the Bayesian sense.  18 
 Moreover, for non-human animals, it has been argued that Bayesian inference confers a 19 
natural selection advantage [5-6] and there have been simulations of how natural selection enables 20 
the computation of Bayesian priors across generations [7] or other aspects of Bayesian behaviour [8] 21 
(the first step in probabilistic inference is the determination of priors, that is, the assumptions 22 
regarding the probabilities of relevant events prior to any new information). Evidence for animal 23 
behaviour consistent with Bayesian inference has been observed in, for example, foraging [9] or 24 
mating ([10]; overview in [11). The requirement of optimality in animal behaviour is often grounded 25 
in Bayesian terms, even acknowledging that Bayesian consistency may be focused on particular 26 
environments or circumstances [8,12].  27 
 However, for both humans and non-human animals, there have been inconsistencies 28 
between Bayesian principles and behaviour. For humans, some evocative examples have been 29 
produced by the influential work of Tversky and Kahneman. For example, Tversky and Kahneman 30 
described a hypothetical person, Linda, as outgoing, concerned with equality, and intellectually 31 
restless [13]. Naïve participants considered it more likely that Linda is a bank teller and a feminist, 32 
than just a bank teller. Such conjunction fallacies challenge Bayesian intuition at a fundamental level; 33 
it is like judging that it is more likely to rain and snow in December, than just snow. Interestingly, 34 
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analogous fallacies appear in animal behaviour too. For example, rhesus macaques can show 35 
ambiguity aversion [14] and pigeons sometimes show the less is more effect, whereby a desirable 36 
food plus a less desirable food is perceived less appealing than the desirable food alone [15].  37 
 As Valone ([11], p.257) noted, “Greater attention needs to be devoted to understanding 38 
when and when not to expect Bayesian updating and to determine the limits of Bayesian updating in 39 
animals.” The exact point applies to human behaviour too. Here we pursue a novel perspective to 40 
the emergence of non-Bayesian behaviour in humans, motivated by the apparent increase in 41 
dysfunctional disagreement in, e.g., modern political debate. We call dysfunctional disagreement 42 
when it appears impossible for two parties to converge, regardless of iterations and evidence. Our 43 
analysis is not restricted to political debate, but it is easier to develop the argument this way.  44 
The evidence for increasing dysfunctional disagreement and deterioration in the quality of 45 
political debate is strong. For example, consider: the emergence of “truthiness”, as in Colbert’s 46 
quote above (based on his satirical show), which can be defined as "truth that comes from the gut, 47 
not books" [16]; the increasing dissemination of “fake news” [17] and their ability to set the political 48 
agenda [18]; the intense polarization surrounding recent political events (e.g., the Brexit referendum 49 
vote in the UK). Kahan ([19], p.1) offers an evocative quote: “Never have human societies known so 50 
much about mitigating the dangers they face but agreed so little about what they collectively know.”  51 
 It is tempting to consider these points unsurprising, because there is a staggering range of 52 
factors contributing to disagreement, particularly when people rely on false information  [20]. 53 
Disagreement may arise due to emotional influences. Emotion can overwhelm objective information 54 
[21] or bias the activated information [22]. Some theorists suggest that all reasoning is motivated 55 
[23], so that discourse is guided just by insistence on a particular position. Differences in values can 56 
result in persistent disagreement [24]. For example, conflicts between a refutation message for a 57 
prior position and valued self-conceptions may lead people to become more entrenched [25]. There 58 
are several related biases. For example, the disconfirmation bias is scepticism for premises 59 
incongruent with one’s beliefs [26]. The “mybias” is collecting information and assessing evidence in 60 
a way biased in favour of a person’s beliefs [27]. Mybias is especially problematic in information-rich 61 
societies, since plurality and freedom of expression mean that one can find supporting opinions for 62 
any position. For example, Del Vicario et al. [28] argued that information related to distinct 63 
narratives generates homogeneous, polarized communities on Facebook. Such echo chambers could 64 
embody contradictory perspectives between them [29] and lead to distorted pictures regarding 65 
consensus.  66 
 We focus on individuals striving to be as Bayesian as possible, be up to date with the 67 
relevant information, and be willing to put aside their egos in the interest of resolving disagreements 68 
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constructively. We call such individuals well-meaning, and also suggest that they can set aside 69 
unmovable personal values (i.e., we need not worry about disagreement from values, [24]). Such 70 
well-meaning individuals should be able to avoid most of the ‘standard’ sources of disagreement. 71 
For example, in dual decision routes analytic vs. intuitive components [30] correspond to thoughtful 72 
vs. spontaneous cognition. Bayesian inference might be predominantly localized in the analytic 73 
route; but, the relative balance between different routes is partly under conscious control, 74 
depending on effort, time etc. Or Bayesian inference might be reflected in the intuitive route, with 75 
non-Bayesian behaviour arising from limitations from working memory or language when accessing 76 
the basis of intuitive judgments [31]. But, it should be possible to reduce such limitations, with 77 
effort. Also, decision biases might be avoidable with the adoption of behavioural rules [32]; it is 78 
known that emotions can be monitored and their impact on behaviour limited [33]; etc.  79 
Here is the paradox: more people are educated than ever before in history, there is more 80 
insight regarding decision biases, we have better understanding of the importance of the common 81 
good, and access to information has never been easier. All these factors should increase our capacity 82 
for Bayesian cognition. At the very least, we can assume that the proportion of well-meaning 83 
individuals in society has not changed, maybe even increased (would we not like to consider 84 
ourselves as well-meaning?). So, why does it appear that increasingly there is dysfunctional 85 
disagreement surrounding many current debates? 86 
 We suggest that, even for well-meaning individuals, information overload challenges our 87 
capacity for Bayesian thought, in a way that leads to dysfunctional disagreement. It is easiest to 88 
make our case in relation to political debate, but the ideas are general. First, we ask whether there is 89 
increasing information overload in political debate. The case is straightforward. One cause of 90 
information overload is the multiplicity of media and ways to disseminate information in modern 91 
society. Practically every second, the internet, television , mobile phones etc. pump out massive 92 
amounts of news, comments on the news, and comments on the comments. Another cause is that, 93 
in a technologically advanced society, some debates are complex, for example, because they relate 94 
to technological innovations that cannot be easily comprehended in lay terms. Access to information 95 
has never been easier and we enjoy unprecedented benefits from technological advancement, yet 96 
these factors contribute to massive information overload.  97 
Second, we consider whether information overload might contribute to dysfunctional 98 
disagreement. There are indications that this is the case [34]. Allenby and Sarewitz [35] suggest that 99 
the technological complexity of modern society is such that informed decisions are beyond the 100 
scope of comprehension for the majority of us. John [36] suggests that scientists best serve society 101 
by relaxing the maxims of transparency and openness—not because openness and transparency are 102 
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undesirable, but because too much information may damage public trust in science, because the 103 
public’s folk philosophy of science is at odds with the actual workings of science. There is clearly a 104 
pessimistic view concerning whether people can deal with the information complexity in modern 105 
political debates [37-38].  106 
 We develop a precise link between information overload and non-Bayesian inference and 107 
consider the implications for dysfunctional disagreement, even for well-meaning individuals. It is 108 
interesting that animal behaviour researchers have also considered whether information overload 109 
(environmental complexity) might challenge Bayesian processes [39].  110 
 111 
2. Outline of Methods  112 
We consider two well-meaning individuals, Alice and Bob, debating a question and examine their 113 
capacity for avoiding dysfunctional disagreement, under conditions of information overload. 114 
Convergence means agreement on at least the probabilities for question outcomes, noting that in 115 
complex debates it is rarely the case there are uncontested observations, even for good faith actors. 116 
We quantify information overload in terms of the number of ancillary questions, which inform our 117 
decision on a key question. For example, suppose Alice is interested in the Brexit question. She could 118 
inform her eventual decision on Brexit by considering questions such as ‘Will Brexit be good for the 119 
economy?’, ‘Will Brexit be good for employment rights’ etc., noting that each of these questions 120 
could be further broken down. There is information overload when the number of these ancillary 121 
questions increases beyond a ‘practical’ point.  122 
 Can well-meaning individuals agree to disagree? Bounded rationality is the form of 123 
rationality which emerges when the resources of the reasoning agent are insufficient for full 124 
rationality. So, what are forms of bounded rationality under conditions of information overload and 125 
the implications for dysfunctional disagreement?  126 
 127 
3. Disagreement and Bayesian rationality  128 
 129 
Consider well-meaning Alice and Bob debating a complex political question and assume they share 130 
their questions and outcomes. They then use their respective information to define a probability 131 
distribution and update their beliefs as rational Bayesian agents. Is it possible for Alice and Bob to 132 
dysfunctionally disagree? Suppose Alice and Bob have different information regarding a Brexit 133 
question, but share priors and have common knowledge of each other’s posteriors (posteriors are 134 
the updated probabilities, once some new information has been received). Then Aumann’s [40] 135 
theorem guarantees that Alice and Bob’s posteriors will be the same, that is, two rational agents will 136 
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eventually converge. Moreover, this convergence can be achieved with a reasonable amount of 137 
effort [41]. The requirement of common priors may appear stringent; however, it can be replaced by 138 
milder ones [42]. Even without common priors, Bayesian Alice and Bob willing to share information 139 
must eventually converge. The Bernstein, von Mises’s theorem guarantees that Bayesian updating 140 
will converge posteriors (as long as there is no ‘zero priors’ trap, [43]). Finally, some of these results 141 
depend on honest exchange of information. For well-meaning Alice and Bob this should be 142 
straightforward, assuming they can agree on acceptable error bounds. Overall, well-meaning 143 
Bayesian Alice and Bob committed to full Bayesian inference cannot agree to disagree [41-42].  144 
 How practical is it for Alice and Bob to be fully Bayesian under conditions of information 145 
overload? The essential idea is this (see also Supplementary Material 1). Consider a finite set Ω of all 146 
possible elementary events (the most specific events which can occur) and all possible subsets, 147 
including the null set ∅ and Ω itself. This set theoretic representation of events is appropriate if each 148 
event is either true or not true1. We can perform logical operations on these subsets, union, 149 
intersection, and complementation, which correspond to the familiar operations of conjunction, 150 
disjunction, and negation. The requirement that each of these operations produces a subset of Ω 151 
enables an algebra over the space of subsets, which is a Boolean algebra (because the operations 152 
obey commutativity, associativity, and distributivity). We can then define a probability measure over 153 
these subsets, which is, a map from the space of subsets to the real number interval [0, 1], with 154 
normalization 1 for Ω.  155 
 Consider Alice confronted with questions A,B,C,D…, each of which can have possible 156 
outcomes A1…An, B1…Bm etc. Each block of question outcomes generates its own Boolean algebra, 157 
𝛽(𝐴), 𝛽(𝐵), … Before Alice can engage with probabilistic reasoning for a question, she first needs to 158 
construct these individual Boolean algebras, which involves a process of specifying conjunctions, 159 
disjunctions, and negations of outcomes. But, for a Bayesian Alice confronted with questions, A, B, … 160 
F, it is insufficient to have 𝛽(𝐴), 𝛽(𝐵) … 𝛽(𝐹). For a consistent joint probability distribution across 161 
any combination of question outcomes, she also needs to construct a bigger Boolean algebra 162 
𝛽(𝐴, 𝐵, … 𝐹), which integrates the algebras for the individual questions in a consistent way. This 163 
larger algebra requires knowledge of conjunctions and disjunctions for all the individual question 164 
outcomes 𝐴𝑖, … , 𝐹𝑗, belonging to the different algebras 𝛽(𝐴), 𝛽(𝐵), … 𝛽(𝐹).  165 
The problem of intractability of full Bayesian representations is well known, cf. the idea of 166 
magic sets in Artificial Intelligence [44]. We illustrate it in the case of debating e.g. Brexit and 167 
 
1 On any Boolean algebra, it is possible to define a truth function taking values ‘true’ or ‘not true’. On 
a partial Boolean algebra, see below, such a truth function cannot be introduced.  
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ancillary questions, such as whether Brexit might be good for the economy, labour laws, etc. If we 168 
had nine binary ancillary questions, then the elementary events would be enumerated as  169 
1. Brexityes, X1yes…X9yes 170 
2. Brexityes, X1yes…X9no 171 
… 172 
1024. Brexitno, X1no…X9no 173 
Given these 210=1024 elementary events, we can evaluate any more elaborate question, for 174 
example, a conjunction involving some question outcomes vs. others, such as 175 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋1𝑦𝑒𝑠&𝑋2𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑋3𝑦𝑒𝑠&𝑋5𝑛𝑜). But, the immense expressive power of Bayesian theory 176 
comes with the price of requiring knowledge of the joint probability distribution – here, the 177 
probabilities of all 1024 elementary events. The more questions we have, the more complex the 178 
joint probability distribution and so any probabilistic inference. As the number of questions n and 179 
outcomes per question k increase, the number of terms in the joint probability distribution increase 180 
as 𝑘𝑛.  181 
To quantify complexity, we adopt an information-theoretic coding scheme and compute 182 
information costs ([45-46]; Supplementary Material 1). The coding cost of D numbers can be 183 
specified by dividing the relevant number range into D bins and assigning each number to one bin, 184 
which requires log2 𝐷 bits for each number for a total of 𝐷 log2 𝐷 bits. This is intuitive because if the 185 
D numbers were uniformly distributed, we would have enough bins to just make them discriminable 186 
(if D=100, these statements are equivalent to representing the numbers with two decimal places; 187 
Supplementary Material 2). Therefore, the information cost for representing probabilistic 188 
information for n questions with k outcomes each is (𝑘𝑛 − 1) log2(𝑘
𝑛 − 1) bits, approximated as 189 
𝑘𝑛 log2 𝑘
𝑛.  190 
Information overload clearly undermines full Bayesian inference. Consider a person living in 191 
an isolated community a hundred years ago. He would be confronted with a fairly limited range of 192 
questions, each of which would be affected by relatively few events. So, it would be undemanding to 193 
create a Boolean algebra of all questions, including conjunctions, disjunctions etc. Today, especially 194 
in political debate, we are confronted with questions of immense complexity. Consider Alice faced 195 
with the Brexit dilemma. There are hundreds of questions relevant to resolving the dilemma, across 196 
several categories, for example, relating to finance, immigration, security, and so on. Alice does not 197 
have the time or resources (mental or otherwise) to create a full Boolean algebra for all questions 198 
and their outcomes.  199 
 When confronted with a complex probability distribution, a powerful approach is sampling 200 
algorithms, such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods [3,47-48]. An MCMC method will 201 
9  dyfunctional disagreement 
 
 
approximate Bayesian computations, by employing samples from the probability distribution, 202 
instead of the full distribution. Such samples are often selected to favour more probable parts of the 203 
distribution and depending on the similarity of the parts already selected. However, in the present 204 
case, sampling approximations will not help: when faced with problems of increasing complexity, 205 
sampling from the full distribution will delay, but not avoid, the exponential explosion of probability 206 
terms.  207 
 208 
4. Bayesian Networks  209 
 210 
The first approach we consider for mitigating the problems of complex distributions is Bayesian 211 
Networks [e.g., 49]. Suppose we recognize that in many cases questions will be independent of each 212 
other, so that e.g. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴|𝐵) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴) or conditionally independent so that e.g. 213 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴&𝐵|𝑋) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴|𝑋) ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐵|𝑋). Clearly, such an approach has simplifying potential, since 214 
a complex conditional probability 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴|𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3, 𝑋4 … ) might be easily computable as e.g.  215 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴|𝑋1). The way to formalize assumptions about conditional independence is Bayesian 216 
Networks. Bayesian Networks represent (acyclic) probabilistic relations between a set of variables, 217 
such that each variable is a node and causal relations are represented as directed edges. The 218 
simplifying potential of Bayesian Networks rests with their Markov property: without causal 219 
dependencies there are no conditional dependencies. So, simplification depends on the causal 220 
structure. Note, there is extensive evidence for the psychological plausibility of Bayesian Networks 221 
[50-51], even if it is unclear whether they suffice for a cognitive theory of causality [52]. Presently, 222 
we are only concerned with the way the local Markov property can simplify probabilistic 223 
information.  224 
If Alice and Bob are overwhelmed by the complexity of their representations, they could use 225 
Bayesian Networks as a simplifying tactic. But it is unlikely they will develop similar causal structures 226 
for their representations, as these would depend on their experience, education, background etc. 227 
Bayesian Networks Alice and Bob with different causal structures means that the powerful classical 228 
convergence theorems (Aumann’s theorem; the Bernstein, von Mises’s theorem) no longer hold. 229 
Alice and Bob could now find themselves in a state of dysfunctional disagreement, even though they 230 
are fully rational given their representations (which correspond to different assumptions regarding 231 
causal structure). Alice and Bob could seek convergence by communicating their causal structure, 232 
but such knowledge is often hard to articulate. Note, there have been attempts to explain 233 
dysfunctional disagreement with Bayesian Networks with hidden nodes corresponding to e.g. 234 
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attitudes which prevent convergence [53-54]. The present point is related, but instead concerns the 235 
inevitable incidental differences in causal structures.  236 
 To estimate the complexity of probabilistic inference with Bayesian Networks, consider 237 
classical Alice contemplating six binary questions related to the Brexit question. Without the Markov 238 
property the probability distribution for a particular combination of question outcomes would look 239 
like 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋1𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑋2𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑋3𝑦𝑒𝑠 , 𝑌1𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌2𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌3𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑠) =240 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋1𝑦𝑒𝑠|𝑋2𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑋3𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌1𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌2𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌3𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑠) ∙241 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋2𝑦𝑒𝑠|𝑋3𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌1𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌2𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌3𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑠) … 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑠). The Markov property 242 
allows us to assume certain questions to be independent. For example, regarding 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴 |𝑋, 𝑌) we 243 
may be able to write 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴 |𝑋, 𝑌) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴 |𝑋). Suppose that Alice employing a Bayesian 244 
Network assumes partial conditional independence, so that conditionalizations depend on m 245 
variables. Then, we would write, if m=2, 246 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋1𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑋2𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑋3𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌1𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌2𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑌3𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑠) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋1𝑦𝑒𝑠|𝐴𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝐵𝑦𝑒𝑠) ∙247 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋2𝑦𝑒𝑠|𝐶𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑠) …, where A, B are two questions on which X1 depends etc. As long as m<<n, 248 
each term requires 𝑘𝑚 probabilities (ignoring ‘-1’), for a total of approximately 𝑛 ∙ 𝑘𝑚 probabilities 249 
[55]. The associated coding complexity for the joint probability distribution given a particular 250 
Bayesian Network is 𝑛 ∙ 𝑘𝑚 log2(𝑛 ∙ 𝑘
𝑚) bits. We also need the information cost of specifying a 251 
Bayesian Network, and can show that overall the information cost for probabilistic information 252 
encoded using a Bayesian Network is (𝑛 ∙ 𝑘𝑚) log2(𝑛 ∙ 𝑘
𝑚) + 𝑛 [log2 (
𝑛 − 1
𝑚
) + log2𝑛]  253 
(Supplementary Material 2). 254 
 255 
5a. Quantum Probability Theory – disagreement  256 
We call quantum theory the probability rules from quantum mechanics, without the physics. 257 
Behaviours that appear classically erroneous can sometimes have simple explanations in quantum 258 
theory, which motivates the psychological plausibility of such models [56-58].  259 
 Informally, quantum theory is just like Bayesian theory for subsets of questions (compatible 260 
sets, see below), but across these subsets apparent classical errors can arise. These incompatible 261 
sets are like knowledge partitions, segments of knowledge such that within each segment, but not 262 
across segments, reasoning is rational. Knowledge partitions can emerge as a simplifying strategy in 263 
complex problems [59-60]. For example, when learning an association between two variables based 264 
on a complex function, a natural approach is to learn the association in smaller ranges, but in a way 265 
that the corresponding parts are not integrated with each other. Well-meaning Alice dealing with 266 
Brexit might try to be rational for specific subsets of questions, but without trying to integrate the 267 
Boolean algebra for one theme with another. For example, if Alice works in the financial sector, she 268 
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may be able to create a full Boolean structure regarding the financial implications from Brexit and so 269 
be rational for such questions. At the same time, Alice is so busy with the construction of this finance 270 
Boolean algebra, that she does not have time to do the same for other Brexit questions, e.g., relating 271 
to security. Arguably, this is what we are seeing in modern society: individuals highly knowledgeable 272 
and rational in specific areas but who, when asked to consider questions across other areas, may be 273 
challenged and even produce inconsistent beliefs. 274 
In quantum theory, instead of a set Ω of elementary events, we have a Hilbert space H, such 275 
that each vector in H corresponds to an elementary event (a Hilbert space is essentially a complex 276 
vector space with a scalar product). Question outcomes correspond to subspaces in H; each 277 
subspace is associated with a projector P (which ‘lays’ down a vector onto a subspace); in 278 
psychological theory, the mental state is represented by a normalised vector in H; probabilities are 279 
computed by projecting the state vector onto subspaces and squaring the length of the projections. 280 
Different partitions in H are defined by sets of basis vectors. For example, in a standard coordinate 281 
space, we might have three basis vectors along the x,y,z directions. Basis sets are not unique. If we 282 
apply the same rotation to each of our current vectors x,y,z, we will end up with a new set of basis 283 
vectors x’,y’,z’. Two sets of basis vectors can be related to each other using a generalised kind of 284 
rotation.  285 
 Projectors can be compatible, in which case we have a Boolean algebra exactly as in the 286 
classical case, or incompatible, when the Boolean algebra structure breaks down. That is, 287 
considering sets 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 … of projectors, such that within each set projectors are compatible, but 288 
across incompatible sets, one cannot combine Boolean algebras 𝛽(𝐴), 𝛽(𝐵)…into one large Boolean 289 
algebra. Each event in this larger structure is no longer either true or not true (before measurement) 290 
and distributivity is no longer obeyed. Instead, we have a partial Boolean algebra, which is a 291 
collection of Boolean algebras pasted together, so that where any two Boolean algebras overlap, 292 
their operations agree. Conjunctions and disjunctions preserve their Boolean features only within 293 
the same Boolean algebra. Conjunctions of incompatible questions have a sequential form and 294 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑃𝐴 ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝐵) ≠ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑃𝐵 ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝐴). Also, a definite answer for a question can create 295 
uncertainty for other incompatible ones.  296 
Quantum theory can simplify probabilistic inference with incompatibility, which allows Alice 297 
to squeeze information about, say, 100 questions (which, even if binary, will require a classical space 298 
of 2100 dimensions) into a space of, say, 10 dimensions. If quantum Alice organizes her large set of 299 
Brexit questions into incompatible themes, each theme corresponds to a basis set in the same small 300 
dimensionality space and the representation of new themes need only involve a change of basis, 301 
12  dyfunctional disagreement 
 
 
instead of enlargement of the original space. However, incompatibility contributes to dysfunctional 302 
disagreement.  303 
One implication of incompatibility is that quantum Alice is more likely to display (classical) 304 
fallacies, which may undermine her arguments. Incompatibility has been linked with conjunction and 305 
disjunction fallacies [61], question order effects [62], violations of normative constraints in causal 306 
reasoning [51], and disjunction effects [63]. Moreover, incompatibility leads to contextuality in 307 
meaning. If quantum Alice and Bob have different partial Boolean algebras, they may think they are 308 
talking about the same question, have the same data, and fail to agree, because they are talking 309 
about different questions (Figure 1). Such ideas resemble proposals in social psychology about how 310 
earlier questions can activate thoughts or perspectives for later ones [64]. Contextuality arises in 311 
quantum theory because the meaning of  question A is determined by considering the set of 312 
questions compatible with A (and some of these questions might be incompatible with each other) 313 
and because the meaning of question A may be affected by considering prior questions incompatible 314 
with A.  315 
Contextuality contributes to dysfunctional disagreement. First, quantum Alice and Bob are 316 
no longer aided by Aumann’s theorem [65]. Common knowledge in the quantum case is not 317 
equivalent to common knowledge in the classical case, because the former lacks conjunctions. 318 
Additionally, questions incompatible with common knowledge will produce interference terms so 319 
that Alice and Bob will not update probabilities consistently with each other. Second, collective 320 
decision-making typically benefits from communal knowledge effects, such as the community of 321 
knowledge effect, wisdom-of-the-crowds, and Condorcet’s Jury theorem. Such effects are not 322 
specific to Bayesian inference, but they are consistent with it. However, all three are undermined by 323 
contextuality. Regarding community of knowledge, Sloman and Fernbach [66] argued that in a 324 
complex world we increasingly benefit from each other’s expertise and sometimes, as a result, 325 
overestimate our own knowledge (a knowledge illusion). The wisdom-of-the-crowds effect is the 326 
proposal that an averaged judgment across observers can be more accurate than most individual 327 
judgments, assuming primarily independence of observations and that individual estimates are 328 
normally distributed around the correct outcome [67]. Finally, the Condorcet Jury theorem shows 329 
that a majority decision (e.g., in a jury) is increasingly likely to be correct, as we add voters whose 330 
(individual) probability that they are correct is just over 0.5. Regarding community of knowledge and 331 
wisdom of the crowds, if Alice and Bob are debating contextual question A, then Alice may be 332 
thinking of AX and Bob of AY, where X, Y indicate differing meanings. This casts doubt on the 333 
rationality of putting Alice’s and Bob’s intuitions together. Such problems are likely to be 334 
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accentuated, because employing a partial Boolean algebra may lead to overconfidence 335 
(Supplementary Material 3). 336 
 337 
 338 
Figure 1. Alice and Bob are interested in whether Brexit may increase the price of imported cheese, 339 
C. Alice considers C with questions related to immigration, while Bob with finance questions. As a 340 
result, Alice and Bob develop meanings for the C question which are different, even though they 341 
think they are considering the same question.  342 
 343 
5b. Quantum Theory – coding costs 344 
 345 
Within a single partition, we have a classical probability distribution for the corresponding questions, 346 
encoded in the mental state vector. We need to specify the mental state for one partition and the 347 
way partitions relate to each other; the latter is encoded in transformation operators called unitary. 348 
So, the information cost for probabilistic inference for quantum Alice depends on three elements, 349 
the mental state vector for one partition, unitary operators, and the cost of allocating questions to 350 
partitions. The mental state vector and unitary operators are specified in terms of parameters which 351 
are real numbers. Regarding information costs, we follow from the above approach to assume that F 352 
real parameters (assumed in a certain range) can be approximately specified using 𝐹 log2 𝐹 bits. 353 
 Label the dimensionality of each partition as N. The mental state vector in N dimensions has 354 
N-1 real parameters corresponding to amplitudes and N-1 real parameters for the phases. This is 355 
because the N amplitudes are constrained by the normalization condition and, regarding the N 356 
phases, the quantum state is the same up to an overall phase factor. The corresponding information 357 
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cost is 2 ∙ (𝑁 − 1) log2(𝑁 − 1), which can be approximated as 2 ∙ 𝑁 log2 𝑁. What is N? Suppose c 358 
partitions are employed and that all partitions have the same number of questions. Then, in each 359 
partition we have 𝑛/𝑐 questions, k outcomes each, so that 𝑁 = 𝑘𝑛/𝑐. The overall information cost 360 
involves additional terms, for how information in one partition relates to information in other 361 
partitions. This cost is 2 ∙ 𝑘𝑛/𝑐 log2 𝑘
















(Supplementary Material 2). Note, the dimensionality of quantum Alice’s probability space turns out 363 
to be only 𝑁 = 𝑘𝑛/𝑐, which seems like a huge saving compared to Bayesian Alice for whom 𝑁 = 𝑘𝑛; 364 
but this simplification is partly offset by the complexity of specifying partition relations.   365 
 366 
 6. Comparisons  367 
 368 
A well-meaning Alice overwhelmed by the complexity of her joint probability distribution might seek 369 
to simplify the representations either by employing Bayesian Networks or dividing her questions into 370 
(incompatible) partitions. For the latter two schemes, the critical parameters are, respectively, m 371 
(the average number of questions each one question depends on) and c (the number of partitions). 372 
Both parameters concern the extent of dependence of questions amongst themselves and, 373 
specifically, the length of conditional probabilities (Supplementary Material 2). Regarding m, this 374 
interpretation follows directly from the definition of a Bayesian Network, while in the quantum case 375 
classical conditionalization occurs only within knowledge partitions. Therefore, it is natural to set 376 
𝑛
𝑐
= 𝑚 or 𝑐 =
𝑛
𝑚
.  377 
We provide indicative estimates regarding the simplification from Bayesian Networks and 378 
quantum theory relative to Bayesian theory, varying question numbers from 5 to 15 and question 379 
outcomes from 2 to 4, Figure 2. The vertical axis shows information cost for scheme A (e.g., Bayesian 380 
theory) minus B (e.g., Bayesian Networks). Recall, lower information costs are more advantageous, 381 
so that when A-B>>0, then B is superior to A. In all cases, probabilistic reasoning with either Bayesian 382 
Networks or quantum theory affords overwhelming simplification relative to Bayesian theory. This is 383 
a demonstration of the essential point that information overload will drive even well-meaning Alice 384 
to make representational approximations, putatively employing Bayesian Networks or knowledge 385 
partitions.  386 
 We also observe a marginal advantage of quantum theory over Bayesian Networks, though 387 
this conclusion is sensitive to the complexity of the relation between partitions. Overall, the 388 
quantum approach to simplification seems advantageous, thus providing a strong expectation of 389 
dysfunctional disagreement due to incompatibility and partitions.  390 





Bayesian theory minus Bayesian Networks 
(m=n/3). 
 
Bayesian theory minus quantum theory (c=3). 
 
Bayesian Networks (m=n/3) minus quantum 
theory (c=3).  
 
Bayesian Networks (m=3) minus quantum 
theory (c=n/3). 
 392 
Figure 2. We plot information cost given one scheme minus information cost given another scheme, 393 
labelled Diff (in bits). The superior scheme has lower information cost. Horizontal axes represent 394 
number of questions (n) and outcomes per question (k); complexity increases with both n and k. 395 
Note, m=3 for Bayesian Networks translates to three questions per knowledge partition in QPT.  396 
 397 
 7. Concluding comments  398 
 399 
We considered how dysfunctional disagreement can arise for well-meaning individuals, because of 400 
information overload. The notion of being well-meaning is primarily underwritten by an assumption 401 
of rational cognition, in the Bayesian sense. There is a strong consensus that Bayesian rationality is 402 
achievable to some extent [1-4]. Our aim has been to understand how information overload can 403 
challenge full Bayesian rationality, how Bayesian Networks and quantum theory offer flavours of 404 
limited or local Bayesian rationality, and the implications for dysfunctional disagreement.  405 
 Regarding dysfunctional disagreement, a full Bayesian would quickly find it impossible to 406 
build the required Boolean algebra, for complex problems. Alice can simplify with Bayesian 407 
16  dyfunctional disagreement 
 
 
Networks, truncating her probability distributions with assumptions about the causal structure 408 
between her questions. Alice and Bob may find themselves failing to converge if their Bayesian 409 
networks are different; Aumann’s [40] and the Bernstein, von Mises’s theorems no longer hold. 410 
Alternatively, Alice can simplify using knowledge partitions [59] dividing her questions into sets, such 411 
that within each knowledge partition she is fully Bayesian, but across partitions apparent errors 412 
arise. With knowledge partitions, Aumann’s and the Bernstein, von Mises’s theorems also no longer 413 
hold and, in addition, the resulting contextuality challenges the community of knowledge effect [66], 414 
wisdom-of-the-crowds [67], and Condorcet’s Jury theorem.  415 
 Is it possible for Bayesian Networks or quantum Alice and Bob to converge? In the former 416 
case, they need to share their causal structure. However, it seems unlikely this would occur, because 417 
we are often unaware of the causal dependencies impacting on inference. In the latter case, Alice 418 
and Bob need to share their partitions (and information on how partitions relate to each other), and 419 
in addition be careful to respond to a question in the same context (Figure 1). We agree with Lissack 420 
[68] who argued that truthiness can be reduced if Alice and Bob “Try to see things from my 421 
viewpoint.” However, we think quantum Alice and Bob will not engage with such a process, because 422 
contextuality is not recognized in probabilistic inference.  423 
 Our focus has been dysfunctional disagreement, because this is an under-researched topic 424 
and because the link with information overload is intuitive. More generally, there have been long 425 
research traditions concerning the way complexity undermines Bayesian rationality. The present 426 
framework can shed light into other instances of behaviour apparently problematic from a full 427 
Bayesian perspective, because of complexity, bearing in mind that there will be behaviours outside 428 
any probabilistic framework. For example, the emergence of some conjunction fallacies, as in the 429 
Linda example [13], could be traced to lack of familiarity with partition combinations. It is possible 430 
that we have a local partition for professions and one for personal characteristics, like feminism, 431 
without making the effort to combine them together. Conversely, the less is more effect in animal 432 
behaviour [15] seems harder to understand as complexity-driven bounded rationality.  433 
In closing, to the long list of factors contributing to dysfunctional disagreement, we add 434 
differences in causal structure and contextuality, from information overload. A surprising implication 435 
is that more information or nuanced perspectives may exacerbate disagreement by further 436 
encouraging truncated probability distributions or incompatible representations as simplifying 437 
tactics. For some important modern debates, such as Brexit, it may seem that we have forgotten 438 
how to evaluate arguments using easily verifiable facts, but increasing information may not help or 439 
indeed be harmful [36-38]. A precise understanding of the impact of information overload, as we 440 
have offered, will hopefully contribute to mitigating interventions.  441 
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Supplementary Material 1 – dynamics and additional details for quantum 
theory.  
Dynamics for Bayesian theory. In the main text we focused the complexity discussion for both 
Bayesian theory and quantum theory on static representations. However, decision models are 
invariably dynamic, so that probabilistic decision models invoke the Bayesian and quantum rules for 
how probabilities change with time. The complexity picture is essentially unchanged; we offer in this 
subsection some corresponding notes for Bayesian theory and in the next subsection for quantum 
theory, also including some additional details for quantum theory,  
The most basic mechanism for probabilistic updating in Bayesian theory is Bayesian 
updating, based on Bayes’s law. But Bayesian theory also allows for a dynamical evolution of 
probabilities. Generally, for each question A, B, C… 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐴 = (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐴(𝑥, 𝑡), 𝑥 = 1, … 𝑘) is a 
probability vector with the index x enumerating question outcomes. For each 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐴(𝑡), the system 
of Kolmogorov forward equations is 
𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐴(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐾𝐴 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐴(𝑡), where 𝐾𝐴, the intensity matrix for 
question A, is a transition matrix which determines which elements of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐴(𝑥, 𝑡) grow more or less 
probable. For a collection of questions, we write 
𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑖,𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= ∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗, 𝑡)
𝑘𝑛
𝑗=1 , where the index i 
selects a term in the complete joint distribution, and the summation over j is over all other terms 
(marginals need not be enumerated separately as they are recoverable from the joint). The Bayesian 
dynamical picture is dynamics on a family of vectors; however, for any realistic situation with 𝑛, 𝑘 ≫
1 we would have a large number of differential equations.  
Quantum theory is likely to be unfamiliar to many readers, from either animal or human behaviour. 
Nevertheless, it is essentially just a way to assign probabilities to question outcomes, alternative to 
Bayesian theory. Quantum theory is an important part of the quantum mechanics theory of physics, 
but it can be employed in any situation where there is a need to quantify uncertainty. We offer here 
Figure SM1, which helps illustrate some of the basic ideas in quantum theory. Recall that question 
outcomes are subspaces. In the same way we can have a set of basis vectors for the entire space, we 
can also define a subspace with a set of basis vectors. In Figure SM1, we consider three question 
outcomes. E, ~E (not E), and G, all represented as one-dimensional subspaces.  





Figure SM1. We consider two incompatible binary questions, (G, ~G; we only show the former) and 
(E, ~E). Recall, probabilities are computed as the squared length of projections. First, consider a 
mental state along the G ray (a ray is a one-dimensional subspace). This means that the decision 
maker is certain about this question outcome, G. However, this certainty implies unavoidable 
uncertainty for the E question, since there are non-zero projections from G to the E (red) and ~E 
(green) rays. Therefore, it is impossible to resolve both questions concurrently. Second, consider an 
uncertain mental state (as labelled). From such a mental state resolving the G and then E question 
(shown) will produce a different probability than resolving first E and then G (not shown). This 
illustrates the non-commutativity of projectors for incompatible questions. 
 
Regarding the dynamical evolution of probabilities in quantum theory, the analogue of the 




−𝑖𝐻𝜓(𝑡), so that 𝜓(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝑖∙𝑡∙𝐻 𝜓(0) = 𝑈(𝑡)𝜓(0), where 𝐻 is the Hamiltonian, a transition matrix 
which determines which elements of 𝜓(𝑡) increase or decrease in amplitude, and 𝑈(𝑡) is a unitary 
operator. If we have compatible questions, then the dimensionality of the space and dynamics are 
equivalent to the Bayesian case. For example, for independent questions A, B , the overall 




𝑒−𝑖∙𝑡∙(𝐻𝐴⊗𝐼𝐵+𝐼𝐴⊗𝐻𝐵) = 𝑒−𝑖∙𝑡∙𝐻𝐴 ⊗ 𝑒−𝑖∙𝑡∙𝐻𝐵 𝜓(𝑡), where the state vector matches the structure of the 
Hamiltonian, in the expanded space. For incompatible questions, there is one Hamiltonian for all 




−𝑖𝐻𝜓(𝑡), 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴; 𝜓(𝑡)) = |𝑃𝐴𝜓(𝑡)|
2 and for another question B (which may not even be known in 
advance), 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐵; 𝜓(𝑡)) = |𝑃𝐵𝜓(𝑡)|
2, where 𝑃𝐴, 𝑃𝐵 can be related by a unitary transformation. 
Outcome combinations for incompatible questions also do not evolve separately, e.g., 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴 ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝐵;  𝜓(𝑡)) = |𝑃𝐵𝑃𝐴𝜓(𝑡)|
2.  
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Note, in Bayesian theory the dynamical equation operates directly on probabilities, so given 
a Bayesian initial state obeying the law of total probability, any time-evolved state will also obey the 
law of total probability. By contrast, in quantum theory the dynamical equation operates on 
amplitudes, which lead to probabilities using Born’s rule. So, an initial state can be made to obey the 
law of total probability, but a time-evolved state need not do so (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009).  
 
We can now consider the complexity situation for the Bayesian and quantum dynamical evolution 
of probabilities. Essentially, the comparative picture for relative complexities does not change, but a 
detailed complexity calculation will be unnecessarily involved. For completeness, we offer some 
brief notes.  
It is straightforward to see that incompatibility simplifies not only representation, but also 
dynamical processing. Recall, if Bayesian Alice considers questions 𝐴1, 𝐴2 … 𝐴𝑛, each with k 
outcomes, then she needs one differential equation for each term in the joint probability 
distribution 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴1 = 𝐴1𝑖 , 𝐴2 = 𝐴2𝑗 … 𝐴𝑛 = 𝐴𝑛𝑧) and then the probability for a particular 
outcome for a question is recovered from marginalizing across these (𝑘𝑛) terms. The increase in 
equations is exponential in number of questions and n-power in question outcomes. Quantum Alice 
considering incompatible questions 𝐴1, 𝐴2 … 𝐴𝑛 needs a single differential equation to determine 
the outcome of a single question 𝐴1 (2 ∙ 𝑘 real equations), regardless of n. If quantum Alice 
introduces more questions, then for each one of them she needs to determine a unitary 
transformation relating the new question basis to a canonical one, whose specification requires 
maximally ~𝑘 × 𝑘 equations (in practice, we would expect quantum Alice to employ far fewer 
constraints in determining the unitary transformation). Relatedly, quantum Alice is able to encode 
more efficiently (some) interrelatedness information in dynamical processing, relative to a Bayesian 
Alice. Consider a single question, k outcomes. Both Bayesian and quantum Alice need to specify their 
mental state, k vs. (approximately) 2k values, assuming quantum Alice employs a superposition. 
Bayesian Alice can include interrelatedness information in the intensity matrix, but new 
interrelatedness patterns require different intensity matrices (size ~𝑘 × 𝑘). If quantum Alice’s 
Hamiltonian is incompatible with the question operator (this would be generally the case for non-




Pothos, E.M. & Busemeyer, J.R. (2009). A quantum probability explanation for violations of 'rational' 
decision theory. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 276, 2171-2178.  
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Supplementary Material 2 – coding costs supplements 
In this section we provide some additional technical details, regarding coding costs for full Bayesian 
Alice, Bayesian Networks Alice, and quantum Alice.  
First, we consider the basic problem of encoding D probabilities. At the heart of the 
argument in main text is the way complexity of probabilistic inference is quantified. The most basic 
problem is how to represent D probabilities. Note, this representation must be approximate, since 
otherwise we are left with real numbers and the information cost of specifying a real number is 
infinite. The initial proposal is that if we have D probabilities, then minimally we need to employ D 
bins in the relevant range, so that each probability is in principle discriminable assuming they are 
uniformly distributed. In practice, this assumption will rarely be true, so that if we insist on complete 
discriminability we may need more bins in certain parts of the range and fewer bins in other parts of 
the range; for D numbers, D can be considered a reasonable, on average estimate for the number of 
bins required.  
 We next consider whether the constraint that probabilities have to sum to 1 can reduce the 
information cost for approximately representing D probabilities. We first have to order the 
probabilities from largest to smallest, which costs log2 𝐷! bits. Regarding the assignment of the first, 
largest probability, we have D possibilities. Regarding the assignment of the second probability, note 
that the first and the second largest probabilities cannot sum to greater than 1. Therefore, for the 
second largest probability, the available choices are D/2 at most. For example, if the first probability 
is higher than 0.5, then the second has to be lower than 0.5, hence the number of available bins 
would be fewer than D/2. Alternatively, if the first highest probability is lower than 0.5, then both 
the first and the second highest probabilities have to be lower than 0.5; in either case, we (still) have 
fewer than D/2 available bins for assigning the second probability. When assigning the third largest 
probability, likewise the available choices are D/3 etc., until the smallest probability. So, overall, the 














The corresponding information cost is log2
𝐷𝐷
𝐷!
, so the total (taking into account the cost of ordering 
probabilities too) is log2
𝐷𝐷
𝐷!
+ log2 𝐷! = log2 𝐷
𝐷, as before. Therefore, the normalization constraint 
for numbers which are probabilities cannot reduce the information representation cost, compared 
to assuming we just have numbers in a certain range.  
 There are several alternative coding schemes regarding probabilities specifically. For 
example, suppose Alice initially places all probabilities in the first bin. Then, she considers how many 
of these probabilities would be high enough to be assigned to (at least) the second bin. These 
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probabilities are at most D/2, so we need to select 𝐷/2 items out of 𝐷 – there are (
𝐷
𝐷/2
) ways of 
doing so, requiring log2 (
𝐷
𝐷/2
) bits. This procedure can be repeated until we run out of bins. 
However, in each step we also need to specify the number of probability terms which go forward (to 
the next bin), requiring log2𝐷. Another coding scheme would involve again starting with ordering 
probabilities. Then Alice knows that after assigning the largest number the next one cannot be larger 
than 1 − 1/𝐷, the second largest one cannot be larger than 1 − 2/𝐷 etc. This is because the first 
probability is the highest one and the lowest value for this probability is 1/𝐷. The smaller number of 
bins that Alice can drop for consideration after the first assignment is one. So, for the first 
probability she has D bins available, for the second number D-1 bins available etc. This means that 
the information cost of assigning all probabilities to bins (i.e., representing all probabilities) is 
2 log2 𝐷! However, a simple computational analysis shows that such alternative schemes are 
generally inferior to the proposed one, that D probabilities require 𝐷 log2 𝐷 bits for their 
approximate representation.  
 There are two more issues to consider. First, there have been proposals for adaptive 
approaches for estimating probabilities, based on the observed frequencies. However, such 
proposals do not concern the representation of (just) the numbers corresponding to the various 
probabilities. That is, presently, we are not interested in estimating a probability from observed 
frequencies, rather the cost of representing the numbers corresponding to the different 
probabilities. Second, it might be tempting to employ the actual probabilities to specify an entropy-
like code. Recall the definition of Shannon’s entropy, which is that for objects x1, x2, x3…with 
probabilities p1, p2, p3, the most efficient code per object is given (on average) by its entropy 
measure. However, the code for each object is different from the code required to represent the 
probability – a number. Put differently, if an object is more likely, its Shannon code will be lower 
because the frequency of the object will be higher, but there is no sense in which a probability 
number p1=0.02 will need more or fewer bits than p2=0.98, since in both cases we are representing a 
number with a required precision.  
 
Second, we consider some additional detail concerning the information cost of specifying the 
structure of a Bayesian Network. A Bayesian Network has a number of nodes equal to the number 
of questions, n. For each node, we have a fan-in of m. We need to identify which m connections, out 
of a possible n-1 ones, are made to this particular node, and there are (
𝑛 − 1
𝑚
) ways to select m 
elements from n-1 ones. This requires log2 (
𝑛 − 1
𝑚
) + log2𝑛 bits for each node (note, the 
information cost is unchanged for each node because there are no restrictions in the number of 
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) + log2𝑛], because we have n different nodes and also we need to encode the cost 
for specifying the integer m, which is log2𝑛 (this term will typically be dwarfed by the rest). 
 
Third, we consider some additional detail concerning the information cost of representing 
probability information with quantum theory. Recall, in main text we noted how in quantum theory 
question outcomes correspond to subspaces. As noted, a subspace is specified by a set of basis 
vectors, which is a collection of orthonormal vectors, called eigenstates, that span the subspace. A 
partition in the overall space can also be defined by a set of basis vectors. The idea of basis vectors is 
essential in understanding how partitions can be related to each other, with unitary transformations.  
Each basis vector for a partition corresponds to a unique combination of outcomes in the 
partition. For example, suppose we have a partition with three binary compatible questions X1, X2, 
X3, then the partition will be eight-dimensional (2x2x2). Each of the eight basis vectors will have the 
form 𝑋1𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑋2𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑋3𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑋1𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑋2𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑋3𝑛𝑜, etc. Consider a different partition of Y1, Y2, Y3 binary 
questions, compatible with each other and incompatible with the X ones. A unitary operator relates 
basis vectors in one partition to basis vectors in the other, which means how a particular 
combination of outcomes for X questions depends on particular combination of outcomes for Y 
questions. In the most complex case, a particular combination of question outcomes for the X 
questions can depend on all possible combinations of question outcomes for the Y questions (in N 
dimensions, the corresponding unitary would have 𝑁2 parameters). We think that psychologically 
this is implausible.  
It is straightforward to show that knowledge of a sequential conjunction for two 
incompatible questions allows one constraint in the specification of the corresponding unitary 
operator. The more the conjunctions that quantum Alice can specify between the X and Y question 
outcomes, the richer the eventual specification of U (that is, the richer Alice’s understanding of the 
relation between the two knowledge partitions). Note, this discussion shows that there is potentially 
more structure in a quantum theory representation than in a Bayesian Networks one (cf. Pothos et 
al., 2017). The role of Bayesian Networks is to simplify dependences between variables, but a 
Bayesian Network itself does not provide guidance regarding how one conditional probability should 
relate to another. By contrast, in quantum theory the separation of questions into knowledge 
partitions needs to be accompanied by information on how the questions in one partition relate to 
the ones in others.  
How much effort will quantum Alice plausibly invest in specifying the relation between 
knowledge partitions? Consider Dirlam’s (1972) estimate of optimal chunk sizes, assuming a 
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hierarchically organized memory. He suggested that at each node in the hierarchy there should be 
three to four branches – and so three to four associations with other elements in the hierarchy. Also, 
limits in environmental sampling have been related to additional reinforcement when learning high 
correlations (Hourihan & Benjamin, 2010; Kareev, 2000) or the facilitation of complex learning 
through a more structured development of the relevant knowledge (Elman, 1993; Newport, 1990; 
Plunkett & Marchman, 1993); such limits might restrict quantum Alice’s ability to develop a complex 
understanding of the relation between knowledge partitions. Likewise, we suggest that quantum 
Alice will seek to understand the relation between partitions employing only a few constraints per 
relation, as 4𝑛/𝑐 per U for n questions and c partitions. Assuming there are c knowledge partitions, 
quantum Alice needs to specify the relation between any one of them and a canonical one, so that 






 (as above, since for each U we 
have to represent 4𝑛/𝑐 real numbers).  
 We next consider the information cost of dividing questions into c partitions. The 
dimensionality of each partition is 𝑁 = 𝑘𝑛/𝑐; for example, 𝑁 = 8 indicates that we have clusters of 
three binary questions. Since each partition has 𝑛/𝑐 questions, we need to identify which 𝑛/𝑐 
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+ log2 (𝑛 − 𝑖
𝑛
𝑐
)]𝑐−1𝑖=0 . Regarding the first term in the 
summation, observe that the numerator for 𝑖 = 𝑐 − 1 is part of the denominator for 𝑖 = 𝑐 − 2, and 











 Overall, as stated in main text, if quantum Alice considers n questions with k outcomes each, 
divided into c equally sized partitions, the information cost is 2 ∙ 𝑘𝑛/𝑐 log2 𝑘















, arranged so that we consider first the cost of the mental 
state, then the cost for the unitaries capturing the relations between partitions, and finally the cost 
of allocating questions to partitions.  
 
Additional references 
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Supplementary Material 3 
We think that employing a partial Boolean algebra is likely to lead to overconfidence. A psychological 
sense of uncertainty is often quantified using entropy, 𝑆 = − ∑ 𝑝𝑖 log 𝑝𝑖𝑖 , where the summation 
ranges across all outcomes to a question. Entropy is higher when more options are equiprobable and 
the more certain we are regarding the resolution of a question, the lower the entropy; e.g., if 
regarding a binary question we have Prob(Yes)=0.9, entropy will be lower compared to if 
Prob(Yes)=0.6. Consider quantum Alice contemplating the Brexit issue, which consists of several 
specific questions. The entropy function is additive and so Alice’s total entropy will be the sum of 
individual question entropies. Suppose Alice simplifies her Brexit Boolean algebra, so that she 
considers only 2-3 questions in her preferred basis set. Given the small number of questions, she can 
plausibly devote sufficient effort to each question and move from a state of higher uncertainty to 
one of lower uncertainty (e.g., with binary questions, suppose that initially Prob(Q1, yes)=0.6, 
Prob(Q2, yes)=0.4, Prob(Q3, yes)=0.5, but after some thought Prob(Q1, yes)=0,8, Prob(Q2, yes)=0.1, 
and Prob(Q3, yes)=0.9).  
Suppose Bob employs a more faithful Boolean algebra, consisting of 20 questions. Bob will 
have a more accurate, nuanced picture for Brexit. However, if we assume that Alice and Bob have 
the same amount of time for their deliberation, then Bob will be able to devote less time per 
question than Alice, and so the reduction in uncertainty for Bob’s (already more numerous) 
questions will be lower than that for Alice. After deliberation, on average, Alice is likely to end up 
with questions of lower entropy than Bob (Figure SM2). Additionally, the maximum possible entropy 
increases with the dimensionality N as 𝑁 log 𝑁. So, if information overflow encourages Alice to 
squeeze a complicated dilemma into a small space (using incompatibility), Alice may end up being 
more confident than Bob, even though her representation is less accurate. There is some indirect 
support for this idea. First, it appears that increasing information can increase confidence, without 
increasing accuracy (e.g., Chervany and Dickson, 1974; Davis et al., 1994; Paese and Sniezek, 1991). 
Second, the Dunning-Kruger effect is the observation that low ability individuals can have a harder 
time recognizing their limitations and so are more likely to feel overconfident (Kruger & Dunning, 
1999).  
 





Figure SM2. Alice employs a more simplified representation for her problem and so can devote more 
time per question than Bob, assuming that Alice and Bob have the same amount of time for their 
deliberation. The blue outline shows uncertainty before deliberation and the red filler after 
deliberation. Alice may end up resolving to a more satisfactory extent her fewer questions – and so 
feel more confident than Bob – but this is largely because Bob’s picture was more nuanced and 
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Supplementary Material 4—some additional computational results 
For Bayesian Networks, more costly representations will involve a more complex causal structure, 
when m=n/3; this is the version we compared with full Bayesian theory in main text. We show here 
that even more simplification can be achieved if the causal structure is simpler, with m=3 (Figure 
SM3a). For quantum theory, more costly representations will involve fewer, larger partitions when 
c=3; this is the version we compared with Bayesian theory in main text. We show here that greater 
simplification can be achieved when there are more numerous, simpler partitions, with c=n/3.  
Overall, Bayesian Networks will afford more simplification when m=3 than when 𝑚 = 𝑛/3 
(conditionalizations are simpler in the former case). Quantum theory will afford more simplification 
when 𝑐 = 𝑛/3 than when c=3 (there are more partitions in the former case). So, the versions of 
Bayesian Networks and quantum theory considered here are even more advantageous relative to 
Bayesian theory, compared to the versions in main text.  
 
 
Figure SM3a. Bayesian Networks (m=n/3) 
minus Bayesian Networks (m=3). The graph 
shows that the more complex causal structure 
(m=n/3) is most costly than the simpler one 
(m=3). 
 
Figure SM3b. Quantum theory (c=3) minus 
quantum theory (c=n/3). The graph shows that 
fewer, larger partitions (c=3) are more costly 
than more numerous ones (c=n/3). 
  
 The final issue is whether the overwhelming advantage of coding schemes based on 
Bayesian Networks or quantum theory, over full Bayesian theory, can be reduced, if some sampling 
approach is incorporated in the coding schemes. We think this is not the case. We can demonstrate 
this by offering variants of the top two panels in Figure 2 in main text, but with an assumption that 
only 0.01% of the probability terms comprising the full distributions are encoded (we do this 
conservatively and approximately, by reducing the probability terms, but not scaling down any of the 
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other costs). Observing Figures SM4a and SM4b, it is clear that an exponential increase in 
complexity, with increasing questions and question outcomes still occurs. So, our essential point 
(that Bayesian Alice will be challenged by the information cost of complex debates) remains, even if 
there are two mitigating factors concerning the urgency of simplification: first, reducing the 
probability terms means that there will be many situations for which full Bayesian will be as good as 
or even better than an approach based on Bayesian Networks or quantum theory. This is evident in 
the figures, because we are plotting only data points for which full Bayesian encoding is inferior. 
Where the figures show blank, full Bayesian encoding is superior (e.g., when n=10 and we are 
considering binary questions). Second, the onset of the exponential increase in complexity occurs 
later. So, Bayesian Alice invoking sampling approximations will be confounded by information 
overload only after more questions and outcomes per questions, compared to Bayesian Alice 
without sampling approximations. Notice that in main text Figure 2 the vertical axis for ‘Diff’ (the 
information cost advantage) extends to 1.5x108, whereas presently this extends to only about 
40,000, given the same ranges for n, k.  
Notwithstanding these points, please also bear in mind that we have explored the impact 
from a massive reduction in probability terms – 0.01% reduction means that for 10 binary questions, 
instead of considering 1024 probability terms to represent her probability information, sampling 
Alice will only consider less than one term (let’s say one term). Clearly, in such cases we have to 
consider just how much accuracy Alice is willing to sacrifice.  
 
Figure SM4a. Bayesian theory minus Bayesian 
Networks (m=n/3), retaining only 0.01% of 
probability terms. Points for which Diff<0 are 
not plotted.  
 
Figure SM4b. Bayesian theory minus quantum 
theory (c=3), retaining only 0.01% of probability 
terms. Points for which Diff<0 are not plotted. 
 
 
